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Panama has rejected a US "visiting forces" proposal under which US military personnel would
receive privileged treatment while in Panama on anti-drug and other missions. At the same time,
the government is being criticized for cooperating with the US aid program to fight drugs in
neighboring Colombia.
Since the US military pulled out of Panama in 1999, the two governments have been working on an
agenda of bilateral issues intended to define a new relationship (see NotiCen, 2000-05-25). The most
difficult issue for Panama has been negotiating an arrangement by which the US would provide
Panama with training, technical assistance, and other aid in support of its new security plan (see
NotiCen, 2000-06-29).
The trick for Panama is to get the assistance while avoiding even the appearance of a return of any
permanent US military forces. In October 1999 and again in May of this year, the US advanced
proposals for the limited presence of US Coast Guard and military and civilian personnel on antidrug missions (see NotiCen, 2000-06-29).
Panama is in a weak position to resist US pressure on the issue not only because it needs US
assistance in support of its security plan but also because it wants the US to clean up the toxic wastes
and unexploded ammunition left on the old US military bases (see NotiCen, 1998-11-19). Panama is
also desperate for US help in getting off the international blacklist of countries accused of tolerating
money laundering (see NotiCen, 2000-08-03). In July, US Ambassador in Panama Simon Ferro
announced a proposal for a bilateral agreement on admitting visiting forces from the US.
A text of the proposal published in the local press said the accord would give exemption from
Panamanian immigration, customs, and tax laws to US Department of Defense personnel
temporarily in Panama for training, anti-drug activities, programs of assistance for the security of
the US, or other missions that had Panama's consent. In essence, these visiting forces would enjoy
the same diplomatic immunities granted officials of the US Embassy.
Later in July, Peter Romero, acting assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, went
to Panama to press the agreement on the administration of President Mireya Moscoso and to correct
misunderstandings about the visiting- forces concept.
Foreign Relations Vice Minister Harmodio Arias later confirmed that, during the meeting with
Moscoso, Romero had insisted on the agreement. Although few other details of the visit were made
public, diplomatic sources told the daily El Panama America that Romero might have carried word
of a "new focus" inside the Pentagon concerning the base cleanup issue.
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Until now, the Defense Department has refused to accept responsibly for additional base cleanup.
Besides the possibility of a new attitude on that issue, sources also said the US was siding with
Panama against France and other countries that have insisted on putting Panama on the moneylaundering blacklist. Speculation on the Romero visit was that the US was using base cleanup and
the blacklist as a bargaining tool to force Moscoso to sign a visiting-forces accord.
Foreign Relations Minister Jose Miguel Aleman said in late July that while it would be easy to give
special status and diplomatic immunity to five or six US "visitors," it was not possible to grant
special status to contingents of up to 600. With increased pressure from the political opposition,
Aleman denied that the government was engaged in talks on visiting forces. He said there would
be no such talks until the Legislative Assembly took up the matter. Ferro said that the visitingforces proposal was misunderstood and that they would be in Panama only upon invitation of the
Panamanian government to train Panamanian forces or participate in joint exercises.
But by the end of July, the government had officially rejected the proposal. Vice Minister Arias said
the Foreign Ministry had informed Ferro and the State Department that the idea "is not acceptable
to us." After that, Ferro admitted the US did not know how to sell the idea, but he also implied that
Panama had misread the seriousness of the US interest in the accord. He said that if Panama wanted
"a high level of interaction with the United States," the visiting-forces issue had to be resolved. He
called opponents of the proposal "extremists," and insisted that every US official in Panama must
have special status. He warned that "Panama must decide what kind of cooperation it wants with
the United States."

Panama qualifies cooperation with Plan Colombia
With the visiting-forces plan rejected, the month of August saw the Moscoso administration
considering what to do about Plan Colombia. The US Southern Command met representatives of
10 Latin American nations in Miami in mid-August to lay out a regional approach to Colombian
President Andres Pastrana's development and anti-drug plan called Plan Colombia (see NotiSur,
2000-06-16). The plan is backed by a US$1.3 billion aid package the US Congress approved in
June (see NotiSur, 2000-07-14). The package includes US$30 million distributed among the five
neighboring countries including Panama that are expected to be impacted by the spillover of the
drug and guerrilla battles in Colombia.
Panama's share is between US$4 million and US$5 million. Aleman said the government would
cooperate with the plan as long as the US did not use it to interfere in the internal affairs of
Colombia. However, the plan has caused concern in Panama that increased attacks against the
guerrilla forces and the drug industry in Colombia would send new waves of guerrillas, paramilitary
squads, and refugees into the Panamanian border province of Darien, already plagued with
incursions (see NotiCen, 1999-09-02).
Ecuador has expressed similar concerns that the plan will regionalize the Colombian crisis (see
NotiSur, 2000-07-14). But Aleman as well as US officials say Plan Colombia will apply pressure
mostly in southern Colombia and that movement toward Panama will be minimal. Interior and
Justice Vice Minister Rodolfo Aguilera said Panamanian police strength would be doubled in Darien
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and that the US aid would provide patrol boats, helicopters, and communications equipment to deal
with any armed threat coming from Colombia.
But opposition leaders are warning against cooperating with the plan and are asking whether the
promised aid is enough. Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD) president Balbina Herrera said
the administration should consult with other parties before making a commitment to the US since
Panama is ill-equipped to deal with the likely border problems.
Pablo Quintero Luna, director of the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad, said Panama would be
unable to handle an increased flow of refugees from Colombia and suggested the government
seek help from the UN to set up refugee camps. Quintero Luna said that, in recent weeks, some
400 Colombian refugees have been repatriated. A special report in The New York Times in April
said at least 800 refugees had settled in Darien and another 1,000 guerrillas and paramilitaries were
operating there, accompanied by 3,000 family members and supporters.
Darien Bishop Romulo Emiliani said, "The border between Panama and Colombia is at this moment
the most dangerous, conflicted, and vulnerable one in Latin America." Ambassador links aid
increase to acceptance of pact Ambassador Ferro said he recognized that Panama's share of the
Plan Colombia "pie" was less than it wanted but held out the possibility that the amount might
be increased depending on whether Moscoso's administration agreed to accept the visiting-forces
proposal.
Another inducement is US financial help in modernizing the canal. Ferro said nothing had been
decided on the matter but suggested that talks might be held on canal improvements. (Sources:
The New York Times, 04/22/00; Notimex, 07/19/00, 07/23/00; Spanish News Service EFE, 07/31/00; El
Panama America, 07/24/00, 07/25/00, 07/26/00, 08/04/00, 08/06/00, 08/14/00, 08/16/00, 08/18/00)
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